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The European Integration of Core State Powers 
Philipp Genschell and Markus Jachtenfuchs
Guest Editors
 During the early 2000s, a tacit consensus emerged 
among EU-scholars concerning the shape of the Euro-
polity. It conceptualizes the EU as a multilevel polity with 
strong powers to regulate economic policy externalities 
among the member states but little power to intervene 
in, let alone assume, core functions of sovereign 
government (‘core state powers’) such as foreign and 
defense policy, public finance, public administration 
and the maintenance of law and order. This ‘standard 
view’ of the EU commanded considerable support by 
scholars as diverse as Simon Hix, Andrew Moravcsik, 
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks. 
 The Euro-Crisis prompted us to question the ‘stan-
dard view’ and investigate the EU involvement in core 
state powers more systematically. We invited a group of 
researchers to map and explain patterns of European 
integration in military security, fiscal policy and public 
administration. In this contribution, we highlight five 
findings of this collaborative research project. 
First, the integration of core state powers has increased 
steadily and partly at high speed. The Euro-crisis has 
led to a massive and rapid increase in fiscal integration. 
Progress in military and administrative integration has 
been slower, but without any reversal. Unlike in most 
federal states, there are no ebbs and flows of central-
ization in the EU.
 Second, the extent varies across policy areas. Inte-
gration is stronger in monetary and fiscal policy than in 
military security and in public administration. This is a 
key difference to federal states where military integra-
tion is invariably high and often was the main driver of 
the nationalization of other core state powers. 
 Third, the integration of core state powers proceeds 
mostly by regulation: EU institutions regulate how mem-
ber states exercise their core powers but hardly build 
up capacity to exercise such powers—no EU army, tax 
or public administration. As Mark Hallerberg shows in 
his contribution below, the EU’s fiscal capacity is much 
smaller than that of the US federal government but its 
regulatory grip on the fiscal policies of its member states 
is much stronger. In addition, as Waltraud Schelkle 
shows in her contribution, there is spillover: monetary 
policy leads to fiscal integration by the backdoor.
 Fourth, the integration of core state powers is not 
invariably ‘high politics’. In public administration it pro-
ceeds largely by stealth, i.e. within technocratic elite 
arenas without major involvement of mass publics. 
Military integration also unfolds mostly by stealth, as 
Frédéric Merand and Kathleen Angers show in their 
contribution below, but is interspersed by brief bursts 
of public attention. Fiscal integration, by contrast, pro-
ceeds mostly by publicity: Key decisions such as the 
creation of the Stability and Growth Pact in the 1990s 
or the set-up of the ESM are canvassed prominently 
by decision makers, and attract considerable political 
contestation within member states.
 Fifth, as Berthold Rittberger et al. argue below, 
core state powers are particularly prone to differented 
integration. In monetary and fiscal policy, the differen-
tiation comes close to splitting the EU in two separate 
groups. In military security, differentiation is more of the 
à la carte variant, with changing participants.
 In sum, the EU is much deeper involved in the 
exercise of core state powers than the ‘standard view’ 
in political science suggests. Why? The demand for 
integration grows largely from the desire of member 
states to limit policy externalities and to realize econo-
mies of scale. This is not fundamentally different from 
early phases of federal state-making. What differs are 
supply conditions, especially the weakness of the Eu-
ropean center and the high consensus requirements 
of intergovernmental decision-making. This explains 
the weakness of European capacity building, the fo-
cus on regulatory integration and, incidentally, also 
the seeming irreversibility of the integration process. 
High consensus requirements make the first adoption 
of integrative measures difficult but also effectively 
prevent reversals at later stages. This often forces po-
litical decision-makers to cope with follow-on problems 
of integration by more integration, even though these 
problems induce publics to prefer less. 
Philipp Genschel, Jacobs University Bremen
Markus Jachtenfuchs, Hertie School of Governance
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 Fiscal integration in the EU and in the US 
Mark Hallerberg
 A core state power is fiscal policy, and historically 
it is a policy area where the Member States have tra-
ditionally maintained their prerogatives. The overall EU 
budget is tiny compared in percentage terms to any of 
the Member States. The power to tax lies at the heart 
of the sovereignty of any state; successive Treaties 
have not changed the unanimity requirement in the 
ECOFIN Council on taxation decisions.  At the same 
time, precisely because these are “big” policies, the 
potential and actual externalities across their borders 
are large. Moreover, the Economic and Monetary Union, 
which includes the delegation of monetary policy to the 
European Central Bank for 17 of the 27 Member States, 
means that domestic fiscal policies take on added im-
portance when it comes to domestic economic stability. 
The initial European economic governance framework 
focused on coordination of national economic policies 
and on encouraging Member States to stay above a limit 
on budget deficits. While there was also a monitoring 
system and even the possibility of sanctions for states 
that consistently ran “excessive” deficits, the Member 
States have been successful both in weakening the 
content of what came out of Brussels and then ignor-
ing it. During the first decade of EMU, the fact that the 
framework did little to restrain public deficits and debts 
seemed to be inconsequential.
 The euro crisis, however, changed matters. The 
discussion of “externalities” was no longer theoretical. 
The Italian and Spanish Finance Ministers have been 
some of the harshest critics of the Greeks and the Irish. 
The reason is that market runs on Greek and Irish bonds 
have direct consequences for the costs of borrowing 
for other countries in the eurozone. Moreover, the fact 
that “core” countries held many of the assets that would 
receive a ”haircut” in the so-called “periphery” meant 
that even countries with strong public finances would 
be hurt. What emerges from this situation is that there 
is pressure for a transfer of more core state compe-
tence to the European Union. Three sets of reforms in 
2011-2012--the “Six Pack,” the “Two Pack,” and “Fiscal 
Compact”--represent mostly greater regulation and not 
much additional capacity building.
 To know how the crisis has changed the EU’s role 
in fiscal matters, one needs a metric for comparison. 
The United States is a good referent. Some consider 
it as the stereotypic fiscal federation. The US federal 
government has fiscal capacity but it does not regulate 
fiscal conduct at the state level.  The EU, by contrast, 
has little fiscal capacity (no taxes and borrowing power, 
small budget) but it does regulate the fiscal conduct of 
the member states (albeit with limited success thus far).
 The global financial crisis affected both the EU and 
the US, although pre-existing institutions played an im-
portant role—they limited how key actors with diverging 
preferences could react in terms of institutional change, 
and with the many checks and balances in both sys-
tems one would think that there would be no change at 
all. But in fact there has been more change than one 
may first anticipate. As Tsebelis suggests, during times 
of crises the two most important states in the Union, 
France and Germany, can become the crucial agenda 
setters for reform. This Franco-German engine is an 
old story, one that remains relevant even in an EU of 
27. Nevertheless, multiple veto players in the EU in 
particular leave it in a reactive mode when it comes to 
regulation. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the European 
Parliament has become a true veto player even in fis-
cal matters. The US federal government, in contrast, 
did not try to regulate the states during the crisis, but it 
did successfully increase further its fiscal capacity. One 
should see President Obama’s stimulus package in this 
light. Once again, the underlying institutional structure 
as well as the preferences of the crucial veto players 
explain the outcomes. 
Mark Hallerberg
Hertie School of Governance
Fiscal Integration by Default
Waltraud Schelkle
 In the course of the Euro area crisis since late 2009, 
the EU has made decisive steps beyond the regulatory 
polity and towards a fiscal union through the monetary 
backdoor. Paradoxically, it was the attempt by member 
states to prevent further fiscal integration and the cre-
ation of further competences for the Commission that 
led to fiscal integration by default. Governments were 
not ready to commit to more than limited emergency 
funds, so bond markets remained nervous and panic 
spread from Greek and Irish markets to Portugal, Spain 
and Italy. Thus, the European Central Bank (ECB) felt 
pushed to accept a politically salient fiscal responsibility 
that is hard to reconcile with the status of an indepen-
dent central bank. Both—the member states’ perverse 
and futile attempt at preventing fiscal integration and 
the ECB’s reluctance to accept a more prominent role 
as lender of last resort to sovereigns—contradicts the 
Eurosceptic account of the crisis. It was the threat of a 
financial meltdown, not government debt as such, which 
forced the hands of the ECB. 
 This fiscal integration through the monetary back-
door is a pertinent example for what the introduction 
highlights as our main finding. Integration of core state 
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powers is demand-driven but differs from earlier experi-
ences of federal state building because of the weakness 
of the center and, consensus requirements that cannot 
be met at the moment. 
 What were the main drivers on the demand side? 
The financial crisis since 2007 weakened the balance 
sheets of banks and worsened public finances dramati-
cally. This created a potential for the vicious feedback 
loop between bank balances and government finances. 
By lowering the quality standard for (government and 
commercial) bonds that can be used for getting credit 
from the ECB or by buying government bonds from 
banks, the ECB tried to interrupt this feedback loop. 
But even without such a feedback loop or unsustainable 
sovereign debt, two more monetary-fiscal interfaces 
are bound to remain salient. For one, the possibility 
that a large cross-border bank can fail makes it very 
likely that the ECB has to step in even if it turns out 
that the bank is insolvent and thus a matter for fiscal 
authorities. Hence, the European Systemic Risk Board 
has now been placed inside the ECB. Moreover, large 
and permanent current account imbalances show up 
in the clearing system of euro central banks, namely 
when banks of exporters do not want to hold the claims 
against banks of importers as they normally do. 
 In all these cases, the ECB, and the European 
system of central banks more widely, cannot refuse to 
respond to the pressures for playing a quasi-fiscal role. 
It is in the explicit or implicit mandate of any central bank 
to maintain financial stability, and thus the infrastructure 
for the transmission of its monetary policy. Faced with 
the prospect of financial meltdown and disintegration of 
the EU—powerful demand pressures—even the most 
reluctant governments agreed to respond to the desta-
bilizing fiscal vacuum with the supply of some policies, 
here: the unorthodox measures of the ECB.
 However, the ECB was quite reluctant to assume 
that role. The central bank pressed for more fiscal inte-
gration, for instance made its buying of Greek bonds in 
May 2010 conditional on the creation of the European 
Financial Stability Fund and would have liked the per-
manent European Stability Mechanism to be a Union 
instrument with a joint guarantee by member states. 
With such instruments in place, the Bank hoped to get 
in a position where it can step back from responsibili-
ties that impair its freedom to exercise its original, more 
limited mandate. A powerful non-majoritarian actor 
cannot preserve its autonomy and retain its credibility 
if it has to juggle conflicting mandates with contentious 
distributive consequences, such as price stability versus 
financial stability. 
 Fiscal integration by default is the result of trying 
to maintain budgetary disintegration against economic-
functionalist imperatives of stabilizing integrated finan-
cial market. Political decision-makers thus try to cope 
with a follow-on problem of monetary integration by 
more integration. It is unlikely, however, that the quasi-
fiscal role of the ECB constitutes an institutional equi-
librium as the proudly independent Bank has become 
too powerful for its own good.
Waltraud Schelkle
London School of Economics
 
Military Integration in Europe
Frédéric Mérand and Kathleen Angers
 Dying for the state is the most conspicuous of core 
powers. The soldier embodies the state. Most observ-
ers thus believe that the European Union is irrelevant 
to defense matters because member states are bound 
to resist opening up their military to foreign influence. 
The chapter we have written tests this claim through 
an empirical assessment of the effects of Europe on 
the organization of armed forces.
 Our results indicate that there has been consid-
erable integration of military power in Europe, but 
mostly though NATO and only secondarily through the 
EU. While the EU’s direct impact on defense policy is 
minimal, as Anand Menon explains in his own contri-
bution to the volume, European institutions have had 
some influence on the organization of armed forces. 
For example, European Court of Justice rulings with 
regards to gender equality and working conditions have 
accompanied a general trend towards the civilianiza-
tion of the military. Also, as Moritz Weiss shows in his 
chapter, internal market rules are increasingly applied 
to defense procurement, with possible future impacts 
for the military. 
 More importantly, we estimate that around 65,000 
European military officers have worked in an EU struc-
ture of some sort since the Common Security and De-
fense Policy (CSDP) became operational in 2003. By 
EU structure, we mean Brussels-based political-military 
bodies and EU military crisis management operations, 
but also national units that owe their existence to the 
EU, for example units assigned to EU Battle Groups 
or EU desks in defense ministries. Of course this is a 
rough number, and it pales in comparison with both the 
total strength of European military personnel (2 million) 
or those who have been involved in NATO structures. 
In terms of the book’s analytical framework, we argue 
that military integration proceeds mostly by stealth, 
although some initiatives, not necessarily the most 
important ones, have drawn public attention. Dimin-
ishing defense budgets and the growing legitimacy of 
UN-sanctioned multinational operations since the end of 
the Cold War have created a strong demand for military 
integration among European countries. To promote the 
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sharing of risks, capabilities and tasks, and to facilitate 
the interoperability of armed forces, policy makers have 
tapped into the organizational resources of two organi-
zations, first NATO but also increasingly the EU. While 
the bulk of military integration is technical and occurs 
under the radar, in places as remote as N’Djamena 
and Kabul, some initiatives such as the Eurocorps are 
given symbolic prominence because Europe is seen 
as a selling point to war-weary publics. 
 The irony is that diplomats and soldiers, i.e. the 
actors most closely associated with the formation of 
nation-states, are the ones who are pushing for military 
integration. By no means are these people the gravedig-
gers of national sovereignty. If they have to go beyond 
the nation state, they tend to prefer cooperation with 
the US to European cooperation. But because they 
are also immersed in a densely institutionalized Euro-
pean environment where the demand for cooperation 
is strong, the solutions they propose often have to be 
couched in European terms. 
 Our chapter concludes with the prediction that mili-
tary integration will continue at its moderate pace in Eu-
rope, mainly for two reasons. First, as Philipp Genschel 
and Markus Jachtenfuchs argue in their introduction to 
the volume, there is no supply of disintegration. Public 
support for European defense remains high, and no 
political force supports the renationalization of armed 
forces. National interventions like France’s air strikes 
in Mali this January have become and will be increas-
ingly rare. Second, demand conditions are stronger 
than ever. The continuing fall in defense budgets, the 
growing cost of equipment, and the premium placed on 
interoperability will continue to bring European militar-
ies closer to each other. Multinational legitimacy has 
become too important, and no European country can 
afford a major military operation on its own anymore.
Frédéric Mérand and Kathleen Angers 
University of Montréal
Core State Powers and Differentiated Integration
Berthold Rittberger, Dirk Leuffen
Frank Schimmelfennig
 Differentiation has become a familiar feature of the 
European polity: the Eurozone and ‘Schengenland’ are 
the most prominent cases of selective EU member-
ship. Moreover, it comes in different shapes and forms. 
Monetary and defense policy are marked by ‘internal’ 
differentiation, a condition whereby a minority of EU 
member states has not (yet) signed up to EU rules. 
‘Internal’ differentiation can be accompanied by ‘ex-
ternal’ differentiation. Schengen is an example: While 
some EU member states have decided not to be part of 
‘Schengenland’, Norway, and Switzerland have adopted 
the EU measures abolishing intra-EU border controls. 
Differentiation can also have an exclusively ‘external’ 
dimension. For instance, EU outsiders participate ac-
tively in the common market through the EEA.
Core state powers display an interesting pattern of dif-
ferentiation when we compare them to differentiation of 
non-core state powers (spending and regulatory poli-
cies). Core state powers are characterized by ‘internal’ 
differentiation. We witness opt-outs in monetary policy, 
external and internal security policies and, as of very 
recently, fiscal policy. In contrast, non-core state powers 
are either uniformly integrated—e.g. the EU’s spending 
policies—, or they display ‘external’ differentiation, such 
as the regulatory policies flanking the single market. 
This raises two questions: First, why do states opt for 
differentiation? Second, what explains that differentia-
tion in the area of core state powers takes mainly the 
form of ‘internal’ differentiation?
Differentiation is mainly brought about by three factors:
• First, if countries are unevenly affected by policy 
externalities or benefit differently from economies 
of scale, they may opt for differentiation. A policy 
area tends to be the more differentiated, the more 
the states participating in integration are affected 
unevenly by externalities and economies of scale.
• Second, publics and voters are likely to demand 
opt-outs if they perceive themselves as losers 
of integration or if they perceive integration to 
undermine their national or regional identity. 
Policy areas that profoundly touch upon national 
identity markers and that are characterized by 
distributional conflict are more easily politicized, 
especially in countries with high levels of Euro-
skepticism. Internal differentiation thus becomes 
more likely.
• Third, sector-specific levels of integration may 
facilitate or inhibit differentiation. Where supra-
national actors—the Commission, the EP, the 
ECJ—hold rule-making or adjudicatory powers, 
they will employ their competencies to prevent 
differentiation in order to uphold uniform integra-
tion or extend the reach of EU law ‘by stealth’. 
Conversely, where supranational actors possess 
limited capacities, they have a hard time to curb 
the centrifugal forces of internal differentiation.
 How do these arguments map onto the internal dif-
ferentiation of core state powers? While security, fiscal 
or monetary interdependence may be as strong and het-
erogeneous as interdependence in, say, transport, the 
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environment, or trade, core state powers and non-core 
state powers are significantly different when it comes to 
the potential for politicization and the powers of supra-
national actors. With the exemption of monetary policy, 
states have shown to be reluctant to transfer core state 
powers to supranational organizations: The capabili-
ties of supranational organizations to press for uniform 
integration in areas such as defense and fiscal policy 
are comparatively weak. More importantly though, the 
integration of core state powers is likely to be more po-
liticized than the integration of non-core state powers, 
because core state powers are highly relevant from the 
vantage point of national identity. Giving up control of 
borders, migration, one’s currency and army is likely to 
be considered a stronger identity threat than giving up 
control of trade, transport or research policies; and the 
integration of fiscal policy requires more transnational 
solidarity than the integration of environmental policy.
 Demands for deeper integration of core state pow-
ers are likely to meet growing resistance of increas-
ingly identity-concerned and Euro-skeptic publics. 
The internal differentiation of core state powers is a 
consequence of this dynamic. The British and Czech 
governments rejection of the Fiscal Compact are recent 
cases in point. Moreover, the relative weakness of su-
pranational actors in the area of core state powers to 
promote uniform integration ‘by stealth’ is a supporting 
factor for internal differentiation.
Berthold Rittberger, LMU Munich
Dirk Leuffen, University of Konstanz
Frank Schimmelfennig, ETH Zurich
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A New Era in European Union Legal Studies
Heather Mbaye
 We have entered an exciting new era of legal 
history studies. Drawing upon a number of recently 
available archival sources and historical methods, in-
novative European Union legal studies are questioning 
long-held beliefs and presenting complex stories of 
the legal process in the EU. For many years, the idea 
that the European Union’s Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
transformed the Treaties into a “constitution” has gone 
relatively unchallenged. The study of how, why, and to 
what extent the courts were able to constutionalize the 
treaties has been a bit tangential to mainstream EU 
theory, but the idea that the courts had done so was 
widely accepted as something of a legal background 
or baseline to integration studies. 
 While historians have long examined the political 
process of the EU, focusing on economics and high 
politics, the legal system has managed to remain – for 
the most part – out of the historian’s magnifying glass. 
These scholars, when focused on the legal system, 
have typically focused on case law. As “high politics” or 
“critical” moments in EU history, these cases are vital – 
Van Gend en Loos¸ Cassis de Dijon, and others – but 
as Bill Davies suggests, “legal history is more than just 
the law” (Davies 2012, 216). Historians, Davies argues, 
are sometimes hesitant to delve into legal studies, 
and often, these studies are undertaken by political 
scientists and other scholars who are more interested 
in those punctuated moments than in a rich, historical 
record. 
 This, however, is changing. Two new volumes pres-
ent a number of fresh ideas and contextual studies of 
legal issues in Europe. The first is Bill Davies’ 2012 
book from Cambridge University Press, Resisting the 
European Court of Justice, and the second is the spe-
cial issue of Contemporary European History (21:3), 
published late in summer 2012 and edited by Davies 
and Morten Rasmussen. These scholars and their col-
leagues are on the vanguard of innovation in both legal 
inquiry and integration studies. Presenting valuable, 
complex stories of legal history, these analysts give us 
insight into the thinking of scholars, judges, jurors, the 
ECJ, national courts, the media, and the public during 
the time period in which the “constitutional” nature of 
EU law was established. They examine in minute detail 
such varied topics as legal thought during the interwar 
period and its effect on the later establishment of the 
EU, German resistance to the ECJ, and the influence 
of the Dutch on the idea of the primacy of European 
law, among others. Taken all together, these research-
ers offer new critiques of and novel insights into our 
understanding of the legal system of the EU and how 
it relates to the greater project of European integration. 
 Bill Davies examines the national reaction among 
the German public, the media, the national courts, 
and others to the ECJ rulings that created direct effect 
and primacy of EU law (the basis of what we call the 
“constitutionalization” of EU law). In so doing, he aims 
to examine theories of “integration through law” (ItL) as 
provided by the literature. He characterizes ItL models 
thus: first, the legalist model provides idea that the law 
is autonomous of society and politics; second, the realist 
model asserts that the ECJ works to avoid provoking 
a national political response and thus focuses on the 
national interest of states; third, Karen Alter’s model of 
“negotiated compromise” suggests that the ECJ care-
fully avoids both public attention and political backlash. 
Finally, Davies asserts that J.H.H. Weiler provides a 
model based on rational choice ideas. 
 Davies finds that, contrary to the perception that the 
Court’s rulings found fertile ground in permissive igno-
rance, a great many German intellectuals, the media, 
and indeed the public were not only aware of what the 
court was doing, but were keenly interested in these 
supranational developments. Attentive people in West 
Germany examined, critically analyzed, and in the end 
rejected these rulings (Davies 2012, 201). The legal 
academy, composed of both scholars and practitioners, 
framed the debate. Particularly in the areas of demo-
cratic accountability and the protection of civil rights, 
the institutions of the EU and the Federal Republic of 
Germany were openly compared and, in the end, the 
young German institutions appeared to be preferable to 
the public and legal scholars alike (Davies 2012, 201). 
 This resistance as provided by West Germans, 
Davies argues, was effective in institutionalizing a com-
mitment to human rights in EU institutions and laws. The 
government itself was unable to provide resistance to 
the ECJ; but the public and legal scholars were indeed 
able to impact the direction of the EU. Clearly more of 
this sort of research may provide additional evidence of 
the influence of other national publics; the implications 
for scholars are clear. EU historians should examine 
other time periods and other national contexts to provide 
better explanations of European law and the develop-
ment of the EU legal system. The generally accepted 
idea that the ECJ constitutionalized the treaties while 
the permissive public watched is far too oversimplified. 
 Davies also finds that many of the “integration 
through law” theories are insufficient.  Neither the realist 
nor the legalist perspectives are supported by the his-
torical evidence. The “negotiated compromise” theory 
is partially born out, but the model cannot fully explain 
all the forces at work and the outcomes that resistance 
created. Finally, there is little support for the Weiler 
EU Law
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model; Davies shows that “…the rational choice sug-
gested by the model was simply not made…” (Davies 
2012, 212). Davies argues persuasively that ItL theories 
don’t provide a complete explanation of the phenomena 
he describes; new or revised theories are necessary.
 Davies and Rasmussen’s special issue of Contem-
porary European History contains six studies, plus an 
introduction and conclusion. The volume aims to “shed 
light on a number of underexplored areas of integra-
tion’s complex legal history from multiple perspectives 
– European and national, pre- and post-‘coup’ , thematic 
and policy areas” (Davies and Rasmussen 2012, 310). 
To this end, Jean-Michel Guieu explores debates about 
international law in the interwar period. Guieu finds that 
the two World Wars created questions regarding the 
accepted legal doctrines of the time, asserting that by 
the 1950s, “international legal doctrine revealed itself 
to be inefficient in dealing with the new challenge of 
supranationality” (Guieu 2012, 337). European law had 
to fill the void.
 Breaking with international legal doctrine was only 
the beginning. Boerger-de Smedt argues that, although 
the idea of creating a constitutional court in the early 
treaties was consciously rejected, legal scholars and 
jurists were able to include the seeds for a future 
transformation in both Rome and Paris. Two opposing 
schools on the issue created an ambiguous legal order. 
“Because of these ambiguities, the further development 
of European law was left to the individuals who would 
apply the treaties and use the legal tools provided to 
advance European integration (Boerger-de Smedt 
2012, 355). The right confluence of judges would have 
to come together in order to create the legal revolution 
towards constitutionalism in the European Communi-
ties.
 Karin Van Leeuwen demonstrates that Dutch tradi-
tion and legal reform constrained Dutch courts in their 
actions toward the ECJ in the 1950s and 1960s – Dutch 
courts looked to the ECJ for legal interpretation. The 
research shows that national traditions were critical in 
the revolution in the EU legal system (Van Leeuwen 
2012, 370-373). Rasmussen  builds upon this, using 
recently available archival materials that establish 
that “...the Legal Service [of the European executive] 
played a crucial both in terms of devising the legal 
philosophy behind the two rulings [Van Gend en Loos 
1963 and Costa v. E.N.E.L. 1964] and in the establish-
ing of a professional and academic field of European 
law, which would underpin the constitutional practice. 
At the same time, …[the ECJ] did this in a cautious 
and restricted manner to minimize national resistance” 
(Rasmussen 2012, 375). Alexander Bernier examines 
the roll of transnational legal networks in the first two 
decades of the European communities, focused on the 
French Association des juristes européens. He finds 
that previous work on the subject failed to take into 
consideration the rich contextual aspects of national 
and transnational associations. In the French case, the 
association struggled to make any sort of impact on the 
reception by the French of European law (Bernier 2012, 
414-415).  
 The Davies contribution to the special issue exam-
ines the institutionalization of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) in the 1970s. He argues that 
the conventional focus on the ECJ as the primary actor 
ignores the importance of national decisions, such as 
the Solange case in West Germany. Davies argues here 
that “we must complicate our retelling of the European 
Union’s legal history by rethinking the importance of 
national-level agency (Davies 2012a, 419-420). Fi-
nally, Laurent Warlouzet and Tobias Witschke examine 
competition policy and the rule of law from the 1950s 
to the present day. They reveal a complex history of 
interactions between the Courts and other EU institu-
tions, asserting that Commission efforts in antitrust have 
sometimes been overturned or complicated by Court of 
First Instance and ECJ rulings and opinions (Warlouzet 
and Witschke 2012, 453-455). This piece supports the 
idea that historical studies of legal decisions and legal 
processes are necessary to a more full understanding 
of EU policy, as the others discussed herein for the 
development of European law.
 The conclusion of the journal, written by Peter 
Lindseth, draws upon the critiques of the established 
“baseline” of our understanding of EU law and EU 
governance presented in the issue. He argues that we 
should view integration “in legal-historical terms, as a 
denationalized expression of diffuse and fragmented 
(that is, ‘administrative’) governance” (Lindseth 2012, 
457). The very complicated nature of the historical stud-
ies presented in the journal show that perhaps Lindseth 
may be right. 
 These new historical studies confirm that examina-
tions of the processes of the legal institutions of Europe 
can shed new light on our understanding of European 
integration. Far from a straight-forward constitutionaliza-
tion of the Treaties, the nexus of activity between the 
national courts, legal networks, scholars, the public, 
politicians, the media, and the EU courts complicates 
what is otherwise a nice, tidy picture. Unfortunately 
for theorists, our formerly neat understanding of the 
constitutional activities of the Courts as happening out 
of the public eye and in an atmosphere of permissive 
ignorance has now been muddied by historical accuracy 
– and rightfully so. What these studies establish is that 
even more of these analyses are absolutely necessary if 
we are ever to craft an accurate understanding of legal 
integration in Europe.
Heather A. D. Mbaye, University System of Georgia 
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Security, Freedom and Justice? 
Insights from three countries
Christian Kaunert and John D. Occhipinti
 From the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty 
in 1999 and the onset of the global financial crisis and 
2008, the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice 
(AFSJ) was, aside from the accession of new member 
states, the most dynamic dimension of European inte-
gration. Like its very name, the AFSJ entails an inherent 
tension between the challenge of providing security 
concerning border management and the fight against 
transnational crime and terrorism and ensuring that the 
EU embodies the fundamental democratic principles of 
freedom and justice. With the creation last October of 
our new EUSA interest section, we thought it was time to 
reflect on this apparent conflict in the AFSJ and illustrate 
its importance from the point of view of three countries 
that often make headlines regarding EU politics, but for 
other reasons.
 We begin with Germany to illustrate the challenge 
of providing both freedom of movement and security 
in the AFSJ. We start here because Germany’s early 
development via European integration contributed to 
the very need for a great deal of the EU’s present-day 
cooperation on the AFSJ. Especially in the decades 
after World War II, the economic growth of both Ger-
many and the European Community (EC) was built 
on commerce. This increasing volume of trade in the 
EC’s common market led to the need for open internal 
borders, which ultimately materialized in the form of the 
passport-free Schengen zone that we know today.
 Plans for this began in the 1980s as the EC moved 
to perfect its common market and further increase the 
flow of goods and people across its member states’ 
borders. In fact, the common market was fostering so 
much trade that it was causing traffic jams and mostly 
needless checks on goods and people moving from one 
EU country to another, notably at the German-French 
border. At the time, five EC countries decided it would 
be better to promote free movement and manage a 
shared external border, and so the Schengen zone 
was conceived, implemented in 1995 and eventually 
expanded.
 However, free movement for people and goods 
was expected to worsen the challenges of fighting 
transnational crime and crime and terrorism, In addition, 
Germany’s success as a prosperous democracy made 
it a magnet for both refugees and organized crime. 
Flows of both intensified with the end of the Cold War, 
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as political and economic change swept across Central 
and Eastern Europe and as Yugoslavia broke violently 
apart. 
 Thus, in the early 1990s, when the topic arose in 
the EC in to strengthen economic integration by creat-
ing the Eurozone, Germany connected this option to 
its mounting internal security challenges. Germany’s 
prized DM, symbol of its post WWII success would be 
traded for the euro if deeper integration would include 
cooperation on internal security, which would help 
Germany deal with crime and refugees. Consequently, 
the new European Union’s new “third pillar” was born 
in the Maastricht Treaty, promoting cooperation to fight 
transnational crime, manage borders and deal with 
refugees. Within a decade, this initial cooperation on 
“Justice and Home Affairs” (JHA) was transformed by 
the Amsterdam Treaty into the goal of creating an AFSJ.
 While this brief historical account of Germany and 
European integration helps us to understand the inher-
ent tension between freedom and security in the AFSJ, 
the case of Greece reveals the challenges of providing 
justice in the context of competing concerns. In recent 
years, Greece has emerged as the poster-child for the 
euro-crisis, yet observers of the AFJS have also known 
that that it has become emblematic of the challenges 
faced by the EU in managing its shared borders. 
 Approximately 140,000 people enter the EU illegally 
each year, and since 2009, about a third of these have 
done do so through Greece, mostly through its porous 
land border with Turkey. Most of these immigrants are 
poor people from Pakistan and Afghanistan, seeking a 
better life, but some are seeking asylum and protec-
tion from war or oppression at home. These are true 
refugees from all-over Africa and Asia, but lately from 
Syria. Some of these asylum seekers will make their 
claims for refugee status in Greece, but others will try 
to make it to another EU state, such as Germany or 
Sweden and try their luck there. This phenomenon 
reveals four sets of challenges for the AFSJ. 
 The first is the need for an EU role in managing 
the shared borders of the Schengen zone. Greece, 
for example, cannot begin to stem the tide of people 
crossing into its territory and it cannot handle the vol-
ume of asylum seekers that it now faces. Consequently, 
many asylum seekers and immigrants who remain in 
Greece are forced to live under inhumane conditions, 
while those who leave create problems for other EU 
members.
 The EU’s response to this challenge has been to 
create new mechanisms that help countries like Greece 
manage their borders. For example, there are now 
emergency funds available from the EU to help coun-
tries deal with influxes of refugees, new databases to 
monitor asylum and visa applications (Eurodac and the 
Visa Information System), and new agencies to assist 
members states, such as Frontex for border manage-
ment and the European Asylum Support Office.
 Examining Greece also reveals a second challenge 
for the AFSJ, namely achieving “solidarity” among EU 
members to pay for border management. Controlling 
its borders has long been a challenge for Greece, but 
the ongoing financial crisis has made this worse. At 
the same time when Greece needs more resources to 
deal with more immigrants and refugees from the Arab 
Spring, it must make due with less - and the same is 
true for Cyprus, Italy, Spain and Malta. Burden-sharing 
or what the EU calls “financial solidarity” has always 
been part of European integration, but in the case of 
Greece, we see that this is an issue not only for dealing 
with the euro crisis, but also managing the AFSJ.
 A third challenge highlighted by Greece is need for 
the EU to protect human rights as it fashions its common 
policies for its AFSJ. In fact, we should finally point out 
here that the term irregular immigrants is now commonly 
used in Europe (and only recently in some circles in 
the US), rather than illegal immigrants. The latter term, 
it is argued, de-humanizes and perhaps inaccurately 
criminalizes people who may only be seeking a better 
life or even asylum protection guaranteed by interna-
tional law. Noting this kind of attention to human rights 
is not to say that immigrants and refugees are always 
treated justly by EU policies. Yet, concern for justice 
and not just security explain why the AFSJ looks the 
way it does today and helps account for the difficulty 
that the EU has experienced in fashioning its planned 
Common European Asylum System.
 Finally, the fourth challenge for the AFSJ revealed 
by the case of Greece is the need for the EU to deal 
with the external dimensions of its internal security. This 
is not new. As noted above, the end of the Cold War 
entailed new pressures on the EU. Later, the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11had a profound impact on the AFSJ, by 
creating the political impetus for the EU to move forward 
on number of new initiatives to fight both terrorism and 
cross-border crime. Recently, the political upheaval in 
North African and the Middle East has not only lead to 
new flows of refugees to Greece and other EU member 
states, but also fostered conditions that provide fertile 
ground for organized crime, drug traffickers, human 
traffickers, human smuggler, and potentially even ter-
rorists.
 In fact, this external dimension of the AFSJ is not 
only important for the EU as it considers its neighbors to 
the south, but also as it looks west to the United States, 
the third country to be examined in this article. It should 
be recalled that, in the wake of 9/11, issues related to 
the AFSJ rose to the top of the transatlantic agenda. 
For example, the EU had to react to American policy 
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change on container security, as well as new stipula-
tions for European travelers to the US. The US and EU 
also negotiated new arrangements on extradition and 
mutual legal assistance to fight crime and terrorism.
 Through all of these developments, the EU has had 
to strike the right balance between being a good security 
partner for US and staying true to its own principles of 
freedom justice. On some occasions, this has proved 
challenging, such as when the transatlantic cooperation 
has entailed the sharing of person data. This is because 
the right privacy is widely considered to be fundamental 
civil liberty, and related to this is the right to have one’s 
personal information protected. In the EU, this means 
personal data can only be collected, stored, or shared 
for a specific purpose laid down by law and that an in-
dependent authority must be in place to ensure personal 
data is protected. This notion of data protection is now 
a fundamental right in the EU and has been codified 
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights attached to the 
Lisbon Treaty.
 In the US, data protection is approached differently. 
Although privacy is not specifically mentioned in the US 
Constitution, various kinds of privacy rights have been 
derived from the Bill of Rights and been protected by the 
Supreme Court. The US may not have the same sys-
tem of data protection as found in Europe, yet various 
American government agencies have privacy policies 
and offices dealing with data protection, such as the 
unit devoted to this in the US Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS).
 Nevertheless, there are indeed transatlantic dif-
ferences in this area, such as the lack of independent 
agencies in the US for monitoring privacy or data 
protection. While this puts the US at odds with the EU 
in a formal, legal manner, data protection also carries 
greater political weight in the EU. For example, most 
political groups of the European Parliament (EP) have 
strong positions on the need for meaningful data pro-
tection, and there is now a Directorate General of the 
Commission devoted to “Justice” that tends to empha-
size this issue as a fundamental right.
 Transatlantic differences on data protection became 
prominent after 9/11 when the DHS began requiring 
European airlines to share Passenger Name Record 
data (or PNR), which are collected by air carriers from 
ticket bookings and includes credit information, travel 
companions, seating, etc. Although PNR data have 
been used successfully in a number of terrorism cases, 
the provision of European’s personal data to the US has 
raised many questions, such as what information would 
be provided to the US, how long it could be stored, how 
it could be shared among various US authorities, and 
what European citizens could do if their personal data 
were every misused. After years of negotiations and two 
previous agreements, a permanent PNR data-sharing 
arrangement has been in place since 2012, though not 
everyone is satisfied with its protection of Europeans’ 
personal data, especially some in the EP.
 Similarly, there is also a transatlantic agreement in 
place that provides the US with Europeans’ data from 
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecom-
munication (SWIFT), the Belgium based company that 
keep records on world-wide banking transfers and other 
financial transactions. Because SWIFT has a mirror 
computer server based in the US, it has been legally 
required to provide information to the US Department 
of the Treasury for its terrorist finance tracking program 
(TFTP), which was kept secret until revealed by the New 
York Times in 2006. More importantly, the transfers were 
happening in apparent violation of EU law.
 Amid the resulting controversy, SWIFT created a 
new mirror server in Switzerland for its European data, 
meaning the US could only obtain information on trans-
actions involving European banks by special request 
and under the restrictions of European law. Just as 
with the PNR issue, there were those in the EU Com-
mission and member states that saw value in sharing 
banking data with the US, mainly because European 
security agencies wanted the intelligence gathered from 
TFTP and lacked their own means to provide this. Yet, 
others worried more about Europeans’ privacy rights, 
especially many members of the European Parlia-
ment, which, in 2010, blocked an initial agreement to 
allow this, asserting some of its new powers over the 
AFSJ under the Lisbon Treaty. Later that same year, 
a transatlantic deal was reached on TFTP, though not 
everyone in the EU believes that this strikes the right 
balance among the principles of freedom, security and 
justice. Indeed, transatlantic differences on this general 
issue are likely to shape US-EU relations on the AFSJ 
moving forward.
 To summarize, we have witnessed the remarkable 
development of an EU policy area devoted to the prin-
ciples of Freedom, Security, and Justice. However, we 
have also seen that it has not been easy for the EU to 
manage the inherent tension among these ideals, as 
well as the challenges associated with each of them. 
Examining Germany has helped explain why the EU’s 
third pillar was created in the first place, especially as 
a response to other EU policies aimed at free move-
ment. The case of Greece has illustrated the challenges 
faced by the EU in managing its shared borders in the 
context of competing concerns, such as human rights, 
financial constraints, and external forces. Lastly, our 
consideration of the United States has demonstrated 
that meeting the demands of the transatlantic security 
relationship is affected by different approaches to data 
protection. 
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 In conclusion, as we launch our new EUSA inter-
est section, we encourage researchers to explore 
these and other issues related to any conflict among 
the core components of the EU’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. Today, this policy domain entails 
border management, asylum and migration, the fight 
against cross-border crime and terrorism, the protec-
tion of fundamental rights, and cooperation on civil law. 
Over the past decade or so, developments in the AFSJ 
have been paralleled by increased scholarly activity 
on this wide-ranging policy area. The small group of 
researchers who have been following the AFSJ since 
the 1990s have now been joined a new generation of 
scholars who have published a many fine PhD theses, 
books, articles, and chapters – especially over the past 
five years. Nevertheless, projects on the AFSJ remain 
underrepresented at professional conferences and in 
EU studies in general, particularly in North America. 
 Scholars and professionals engaged in the follow-
ing areas will be encouraged to participate in the new 
interest section:
Asylum policy and refugees
Migration policy in the EU
Border management and the Schengen zone
Agencies in the AFSJ
Civil Law
Criminal law
EU institutions and the AFSJ
External dimensions of internal security
Fighting transnational organized crime and terrorism
Protecting fundamental rights, EU founding values and 
EU citizenship-related rights
Transatlantic relations and internal security
 We now launch this interest section and plan to 
use the next EUSA conference in Baltimore to hold 
an organizational meeting. Although this session will 
be used for brainstorming, we already have it in mind 
to organize research workshops in Europe and North 
America, produce edited volumes or special editions of 
journals, and indeed a new journal, based on these, and 
support and encourage the work of graduate students 
in these initiatives. Please join us in these endeavors!
Christian Kaunert, University of Dundee
John D. Occhipinti, Canisius College
Elizabeth Bomberg, John Peterson and Richard 
Corbett (eds.). The European Union: How Does it 
Work? Third Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012.
 One of the primary challenges of textbooks on the 
European Union is not only keeping apace with the 
constant evolution of its institutions and policies, but 
making this information accessible to novice scholars 
of Europe. The objective of this textbook is to provide a 
great deal of factual information in an easy to process 
format, making its key contribution its ability to serve 
as a useful reference guide for beginner students. The 
third edition features a number of updates -- it has been 
revised to include the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty 
and the effects of the Eurozone financial crisis, and its 
context has expanded to include new chapters on the 
EU’s security role, a more in-depth look at policymaking, 
and the democratic credentials of the EU. Furthermore, 
the editorial team has changed to include Richard Cor-
bett, a former MEP and current advisor to the President 
of the European Council, to continue the tradition of the 
previous volumes in offering a practitioner’s perspec-
tive.
 The volume’s focus is broad, while its content is 
extremely concise. It is packed with factual information 
in order to untangle the many moving parts of the EU, 
and is organized in a way that lends itself to easy refer-
ence and quick review. Chapters are short, and begin 
with a summary that displays the upcoming themes to 
be discussed. Each chapter features frequent boxes 
that review key concepts or provide quantitative data 
via tables and charts, and concludes with a set of dis-
cussion questions, an admirably comprehensive list of 
citations for further reading, and a summary of useful 
websites to aid in research. The appendix features a 
chronology of important dates in European integration, 
and a useful glossary that covers relevant institutions 
and actors as well as EU jargon.
 Substantively, the content is as expected. Parts I 
and II of the volume briefly cover various social scien-
tific approaches to studying the EU, the history of its 
creation, and the roles and responsibilities of its major 
institutions. Part III focuses on the significant policies 
of the EU, their supranational characteristics, a de-
tailed discussion of how policies are made, and the 
democratic elements of the institutions. Part IV covers 
European expansion, its role as a security actor, and the 
evolution of foreign policy. The final section turns back 
to how social science interprets the unique institution 
of the EU and discusses avenues for future research. 
Book Reviews
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Harold James.  Making the European Monetary Union. 
Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 2012.
 This study was commissioned in 2008 by the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) to present an historical review of the 
institutional files covering the background work, over 
the period 1964 through 1993, in the institutional and 
operational framework for the establishment of a com-
mon currency regime.  The main formal working group 
under examination was the Committee of Governors 
of the Central Banks of the Member States of the Eu-
ropean Economic Community (CoG), the forerunner of 
the European Monetary Institute (EMI) established in 
Frankfurt in 1994.  
 Harold James, Kelly Professor in European Stud-
ies and Professor of History and International Affairs 
at Princeton University, was given privileged access, 
under a waiver of the usual 30-year restriction, to ECB 
and BIS archived materials and in particular the CoG 
records held at the ECB.  In tandem, special access was 
also granted to a number of national central banks’ files. 
Professor James is a very well-regarded Cambridge 
University educated historian specializing in financial 
history and the history of modern Germany.
 The primary parts of the text are given over to 
lengthy but clear and coordinated expositions outlin-
ing the major issues and decisions taken by the CoG 
and other related working groups such as the Delors 
Committee.  While nearly all of these details have been 
reported in a variety of media, the comprehensive 
nature of the analysis and the very long period of time 
covered bring a unity to the historical record focused 
on the constrained development and evolution of the 
single currency project.  As historical documentation of 
the primary decision-making process, the presentation 
clearly offers a well-organized and successful rendition 
of the relevant facts. 
 Occasionally the author adds to the record by giving 
insights into the motivations and strategies undertaken 
by the primary actors.  These highlighted revelations 
expose the behind the scenes nature of the political-
economy environment at work in shaping the legitimate 
boundaries of the discussion of institutional structures 
and policy goals.
 The central problems examined revolved around 
complications arising from the international financial 
power locus built with the U.S. dollar as the centerpiece. 
After the end of the Bretton Woods area it became 
increasingly challenging to maintain exchange rate 
stability vis-a-vis the dollar.  Further complications were 
added by the nature of the centrality of the growing 
export-led German economy in a more openly inte-
grated set of European product and capital markets. 
The volume is edited, and so chapters tend to vary on 
their clarity (especially in writing) and contribution. No-
table chapters include a fairly in-depth coverage of the 
various steps required in developing EU policy, and an 
assertive defense of the democratic deficit that could 
provoke interesting discussion in a classroom setting.
 This textbook is akin to a very detailed map, rather 
than a guidebook – its focus is not depth, but rather 
providing key information and inspiring potential routes 
to follow. Thus one of the volume’s biggest strengths 
in synthesizing information can in turn be considered 
its greatest weakness. The information is compart-
mentalized into so many different pieces that in some 
chapters the presentation of the content is too divided 
between the supplementary boxes and the ambitious 
narrative presented in the main text. Furthermore, while 
the factual information is well presented, due to space 
constraints the volume lacks coverage of more theoreti-
cal concepts or political analysis. 
 Yet potentially to compensate, one unique aspect 
of the textbook is that it encourages outside research 
and investigation. At the end of each chapter there is 
an extensive list of references for further reading, and 
web links to sources mentioned in the text (for example, 
in the chapter on policymaking and organized interests, 
the websites of notable think tanks and other formal 
institutions that represent lobby groups are provided). 
In addition, for this textbook Oxford University Press has 
established an Online Resource Centre for that provides 
teaching and learning materials. While the online site is 
very simple, it provides a number of potentially useful 
resources, including an interactive map of Europe, an 
online flashcard application, lecture slides, and practice 
multiple-choice questions for each chapter. While these 
materials are primarily appropriate for the level of an 
introductory undergraduate or a novice instructor, the 
development of online resources is a promising addi-
tion.
 Given its ability to condense key information about 
the EU in an easy to absorb format plus the detailed 
reading lists and references provided make this a “go to” 
book for the beginner or policy-oriented student (which 
is clearly stated as the volume’s goal in the first place). 
Its role is best served when paired with more theoreti-
cal sources on the EU in a comprehensive course on 
European politics, or as an ideal quick reference guide 
in courses that only have time to address the EU briefly 
or in a comparative perspective. 
Alexandra Cirone
Columbia University
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 Most readers will appreciate the time spent detailing 
the origins of the CoG which grew out of the need to 
better coordinate the international monetary and pay-
ments system within the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC).  Established under the Treaty of Rome, the 
EEC came into existence at the beginning of 1958 with 
a primary agenda built around the development of the 
Common Market.  Significant progress would crucially 
depend on promoting more liberalized capital flows in 
an environment of increased exchange rate stability. 
While the Council of Ministers of the EEC (ECOFIN) 
shepherded the initial directions in these policy areas, 
by 1964 the ECOFIN decided to create a more special-
ized CoG to provide continuity in policy guidance over 
these domains.
 The remaining chapters follow the work of the CoG 
in developing and implementing the European Mon-
etary System (EMS) and the evolving set of exchange 
rate regimes including the “currency snake” and the 
establishment of the Exchange Rate Mechanism.  The 
policy and institutional developments are laid out within 
the context of the changing nature of international 
macroeconomic conditions and resulting problematic 
pressures on interest and exchange rates.
 Most readers will be well-prepared for the presenta-
tion of the more commonly recognized material describ-
ing the work of the Delors Committee and the unfolding 
of the design steps toward the establishment of the 
ECB.  The book culminates with a detailed examination 
of the turmoil spun out of the early 1990s EMS crisis 
and resulting negotiations toward the final draft of the 
Maastricht Treaty and its ratification process. 
 In addition to laying out the detailed central his-
torical record of the run up to Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) the book offers a set of important appen-
dices covering stages in the development of the text 
of the Maastricht Treaty, a comprehensive list of pri-
mary institutional actors, and an extensive institutional 
chronology covering the second half of the twentieth 
century.  In aggregate, the contents will serve as a 
useful reference book for scholars and students of the 
historical record of EMU.  The details and the general 
text are sufficiently technical in nature as to require a 
solid background knowledge of the fundamentals of 
international financial markets and monetary policy 
tools and practices. 
 The book is an exceptional example of the ex-
planatory power from combined insights rendered by 
professional archival research and reasoned judgments 
about the motivations and guiding principles of the ac-
tive agents.  The ECB and the BIS have done excellent 
service in sponsoring these efforts and our knowledge 
of this important period of monetary history has been 
much advanced by the author’s tireless efforts.  
 What is much less useful is the final section titled 
“The Euro and the Legacy of the Committee of Gov-
ernors.”  The BIS-ECB commission was to cover the 
period from 1958-1993 but the author could not resist 
writing a short addendum attempting to offer a number 
of insights garnered from the historical record to the 
lingering current euro crisis.  The opportunity to attempt 
to show relevancy to a major current policy event proved 
an irresistible temptation.  The ruminative nature of the 
conclusion should not detract from the excellent record, 
during the euro era, of the ECB‘s success in operations 
under severe policy domain constraints.  An example 
would be the clearly successful record of inflation tar-
geting policy.  Speculation about how institutions might 
have performed if given other operating prerogatives 
and goals, e.g., restructured banking regulatory author-
ity, serves no productive purpose.
David L. Cleeton
Illinois State University
Catherine Guisan. A Political Theory of Identity in 
European Integration. Routledge, 2011   
 The reader of Catherine Guisan’s book needs to 
take some time to engage with the terminology and 
the principles of thinking of Hannah Arendt and other 
contemporary political philosophers. But he gets com-
pensated by an innovative – albeit eclectic – reading 
of the roots and contents of European political iden-
tity and a fine-grained reflection of the principles and 
motivations for action of actors at different stages of 
the integration process and their repercussions today. 
Guisan manages to provide some meat to the bones 
of the beast…
 Starting from the puzzle of how actors that less than 
a decade before had still fought against each other 
could decide to put together the resources for their 
armed forces, Catherine Guisan interprets “speech and 
deed” of EU initiators. She proposes the introduction of 
a new branch of EU identity studies analysing the ethi-
cal and political practices of the founding actors to get 
closer to the “founding myth(s) of the European Union”. 
Guisan points to a striking gap in European political 
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EU-related books, please fill out the form for po-
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Publishers should send a review copy
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field Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, 
PA 15206, USA
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philosophy: unlike in the tradition of political theory in the 
United States, there are only few studies on narratives 
or self-interpretations of what the myth of ‘European 
reconciliation’ means, at least in the breadth proposed 
in her book. With the help of political theorists such as 
Arendt, Jaspers, Habermas, Taylor, Ricœur and Berlin 
she tries to critically derive elements of EU’s shared 
identity from different steps of the integration process 
starting from the ECSC up to the latest accession ne-
gotiations. 
 Her book is a welcome and timely investigation into 
the ideational causes of the complex phenomenon: 
politically, because paradoxically (or not) the European 
Union gets the Nobel Prize for Peace at a moment in 
which it is undergoing one of its severest legitimacy 
crises, and academically, because the majority of other 
studies on European integration focus mainly on the 
economic interests of the actors involved.
 Drawing on Hannah Arendt’s concept of recon-
ciliation as principle of action Guisan proposes a new 
reading of the Treaty of Paris. For Guisan the idea of 
reconciliation is not a ‘feeling’ or emotional motivation 
external to a ‘purely technical’ treaty, but instead a politi-
cal capacity based on hard-headed realism which was 
built directly into the wordings of the agreements. She 
identifies five practices which make up this capacity and 
illustrates them examining discourse and practices of 
Monnet, Adenauer, De Gasperi and others and having 
a deepened look at the relevance of shared material 
interests and the role of the USA as important mediating 
party in the early integration process. In a second step 
the book makes an attempt to trace these practices of 
reconciliation today: in state policies and grassroots 
initiatives between Kosovo and Serbia and in several 
attempts to understand the meaning of European inte-
gration through books, museums and school projects.
 Guisan turns from reconciliation to the affirmation of 
a common destiny - the second precondition for a lasting 
peace project. In her understanding early European ac-
tors found their common destiny in a shared redefinition 
of power as action in concert. The early treaties were 
fruits and symbols of this reconceptualisation – albeit 
under US military protection. Through interviews and 
documents she shows that deliberation and persua-
sion were guiding principles for the negotiations of the 
EEC treaties. Concluding, the author questions the 
European Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
tries to understand how power as action in concert can 
still be possible today with a multiplication of actors and 
projects. 
 The book proceeds from the deepening of the Union 
to the accession of new member countries. Guisan 
draws on Charles Taylor and his ideal-concept of rec-
ognition as mutual transformation to show how policies 
such as programmes of economic and social cohesion 
have facilitated forms of mutual recognition, while some 
accession processes – especially the negotiations with 
Turkey – seem to lack the necessary reciprocity to lead 
to Taylor’s ‘higher stage of self-realisation’ for all par-
ties. Guisan borrows the concept of ‘gift’ from Ricœur 
to explain how events like the tragical earthquakes in 
Turkey and Greece in 1999 may nevertheless tempo-
rarily suspend a blocked process of recognition. 
 Ultimately, the author turns to the inwards and 
outwards relationships of the Union today. She uses 
Habermas’ discourse ethics to discuss the question of 
democratic deficit from the ECSC to the failure of the 
project of the European Convention. Arendt’s reflec-
tions on the capacity to look at an issue from other 
standpoints than just one’s own serves her in turn as 
scheme to examine today’s discourses on EU borders 
and immigration.
 The author comes to the conclusion that the lack 
of analysis and thought about own self-definition(s) is 
a more fundamental problem for the European Union 
than the lack of persuasive discourses. In her view this 
is all the more challenging as the necessity of more 
direct democracy in the EU will in the future demand 
more and more pedagogical effort from EU leaders.
 Guisan’s work is not looking for one-dimensional 
causes for the process of European integration but a 
work of memory and explanation. It is a rare attempt 
to bring together political philosophy with empirical evi-
dence from numerous primary and secondary sources. 
A multitude of documents and interviews with key actors 
are analysed with precaution, guiding the reader with 
ample reflections on the limits of such testimonies and 
on the strategies of the author to highlight their contra-
dictions. 
 The book provides an interesting piece to the puzzle 
of the current identity and legitimacy crisis of the Eu-
ropean Union, in which European institutions seem to 
be deprived not only of material influence and power 
but also of discoursive resources for legitimation.
Anja Thomas, Sciences Po Paris
Finn Laursen (ed.). The EU’s Lisbon Treaty: Institu-
tional Choices and Implementation. Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2012.
 History will note that there would be no honeymoon 
for the Lisbon Treaty.  A less ambitious successor to 
the failed (though substantively similar) European Con-
stitution, the Treaty would take effect on 1 December 
2009 only to be greeted by a stubborn global economic 
downturn, the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, and – 
within a year - the Middle East uprisings.  For better 
or worse, whatever institutional architecture, decision-
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making structure, policy tools, and leadership roles the 
EU would have in place to respond to these challenges 
would be found in Lisbon.  Whether the Treaty would 
be up to meeting such tasks is a core question this new 
edited volume seeks to address.
 “The Lisbon Treaty,” the book’s introduction notes, 
“is largely about institutional changes” (p. 3) and the 
volume’s subtitle, organization, and themes reflect this 
focus.  The work is divided into five parts containing 
fourteen chapters.  In addition to the single-chapter 
introduction and conclusion penned by the editor (Finn 
Laursen), each of the remaining parts consists of four 
chapters; these include institutional choices (administra-
tion – Adrian Shout and Sarah Wolff, Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, or CFSP – Kerstin Radtke, internal 
security – Sarah Wolff, and economics – Ferran Brunet), 
institutional actors (the European Parliament – Rik de 
Ruiter and Christine Neuhold, the President of the Eu-
ropean Council – Carlos Closa, the High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – Carolin Rüger, 
and the new European External Action Service, or 
EEAS – Finn Laursen), and external action (commercial 
policy – Arne Niemann, development policy – Maurizio 
Carbone, economic partnership agreements – Timothy 
M. Shaw, and climate change – Piotr Maciej Kaczyński). 
 Much of the discussion across the book revolves 
appropriately around the core innovations of the Treaty 
found in the new offices of Council President and High 
Representative and the EEAS diplomatic service.  In 
particular, many contributions consider how these in-
stitutions will shape developments in other policy areas 
– including CFSP, the negotiation of international trea-
ties in climate change and trade policy, and global and 
regional development efforts – impact the distribution 
of authority and competence across the Commission, 
the European Council and Council of Ministers, and the 
European Parliament, and add, if at all, to the Union’s 
democratic legitimacy.  The end of the old Maastricht pil-
lar structure and the extension of co-decision between 
the Parliament and the Council for Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA) under Lisbon is another emphasis, and 
the chapter on internal security architecture is among 
the work’s most effective, successfully blending formal 
analysis of the Treaty changes in JHA with a consid-
eration of the deeper implications the supranational/
intergovernmental debate that has dominated regional 
integration theory since the 1960s.  
 While the book is well organized, individual chapters 
are not particularly well integrated and occasionally (in 
the case of the respective chapters on the High Repre-
sentative for Foreign Affairs and the EEAS) cover similar 
ground.  Approaches moreover vary significantly across 
chapters; some have a significant theoretical dimension 
(administration and internal security) or make efforts to 
test hypotheses on the causes of outcomes reflected in 
the Treaty (commercial policy), while others are largely 
reviews of policy developments and Treaty language 
(economic and development policy) or overviews of the 
design of new institutions and their initial officeholders 
(the Council President and High Representative).  
 The volume’s contributors are to be commended for 
organizing, writing, and publishing such a comprehen-
sive study so quickly following Lisbon’s adoption.  The 
empirical analysis in the chapters, however, is limited 
largely to the first year of the Treaty’s implementation 
and some readers may find that subsequent events – 
most notably the EU’s response to the Arab uprisings 
in 2011 and member state rows over Treaty changes 
involving fiscal reform spawned by the debt crisis – have 
failed to vindicate the rather salutary views of Lisbon 
generally expressed by the book’s contributors. 
 This is a work primarily for European policy and 
governance specialists.  While some chapters are more 
accessible than others, in general those who lack fa-
miliarity with the treaty history of the Community/Union, 
the particulars of Qualified Majority Voting, co-decision, 
and the EU legislative process, the complexities of the 
EU’s multi-level governance structure, and the core ap-
proaches in regional integration theory will find much of 
the book difficult to penetrate.  For those researchers, 
however, who are specialists – and particularly those 
focused on the communitarization of internal security 
policy and CFSP – this volume surely qualifies as a 
important contribution that will figure prominently in 
assessments of the Lisbon Treaty and broader discus-
sions on European integration and governance in the 
coming years.  
Gregory Baldi, Western Illinois University
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Claudio M. Radaelli and Fabrizio De Francesco. 
Regulatory Quality in Europe: Concepts, Measures 
and Policy Processes. Manchester: Manchester Uni-
versity Press, 2011.
 The overall aim of Regulatory Quality in Eu-
rope is to set out a way of evaluating ‘better regulation’ 
and to identify whether it in fact leads to better quality 
regulation. More specifically, the book focusses upon 
four tools of better regulation: regulatory impact as-
sessment, consultation, simplification, and regulatory 
access and transparency. The main outcome of the 
book is the design of three systems of indicators (or 
‘gauges of quality’ (p20)) which can be used by both 
the EU and governments as a way of evaluating better 
regulation. Due to the relative lack of convergence in 
the indicators used by governments, the authors do 
not select which should be used, preferring to allow 
the open method of coordination to work towards uni-
formity.
 One of the key starting points, of the book is 
that the EU ‘better regulation’ agenda is to be under-
stood in the same way as any other public policy. It 
thus can be assessed using the same methodologi-
cal tools that are applied to any other public policy 
in terms of its actors, problems, resources, rules of 
interaction, decision-making structures and outcomes 
(p5). Better regulation is defined as ‘meta-regulation’, 
rather than being assigned any normative value. In 
this sense better regulation sets out principles and 
tools that govern the regulatory process. The authors 
make clear that they are not passing any judgement 
on better regulation and that they do not equate it with 
good quality legislation.
 The analytical framework proposed for mea-
suring the quality of better regulation is based upon 
three factors: concepts, indicators, and policy pro-
cesses. The explanation for this framework is that one 
cannot design indicators of quality, firstly, without first 
defining the concepts of better regulation and regu-
latory quality and, secondly, without considering the 
policy processes in which they will be used. The book 
thus suggests a contextualised manner of examining 
regulatory quality and already looks to its practical ap-
plication by those involved in policy formulation.
 The proposed framework is ambitious since no 
one definition of quality is selected. Instead, the au-
thors have chosen to ‘problematise’ the concept and 
relate it to different stakeholders and to institutional 
contexts (p23). The authors recognise that a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ approach to indicators of regulatory quality is 
insufficient in an area such as the EU. A comparative 
analysis of how governments go about measuring the 
performance of better regulation policies further sup-
ported by an empirical study (in the form of a question-
naire designed by the authors) demonstrates a lack of 
convergence across the EU. The results of this study 
lead the authors to suggest that indicators should be 
situated in a broader policy of regulatory reform, one 
that takes on board the specific institutional context in 
which better regulation operates.
 The book’s main strength is its avoidance of a 
deus ex machina approach. The full complexity of the 
European regulatory environment is recognised and 
taken account of in the proposed analytical framework. 
This is most notable in that three systems of indicators 
are proposed in order to fit the divergent regulatory 
environments of different countries. The first system 
is an ex ante system of objective indicators which can 
be used by all governments and EU institutions. The 
indicators do not focus on the specific tools of better 
regulation, but instead upon the design and existence 
of a quality checking mechanisms per se. The second 
system is for use by governments with a relatively ad-
vanced better regulation tools in place. It provides for 
checks on the quality of the actual tools of better regu-
lation policy and on the real-world outcome and so the 
indicators take the form of a series of ex post checks. 
The final system of indicators is intended for use by 
the Commission and governments with advanced 
levels of quality assurance. The indicators proposed 
are for ‘external evaluation’ or for those outside of the 
policy process to collect data and review the quality of 
the policy.
 One final point to note is that the book was first 
published (in hardback version) back in 2007 and since 
then the European regulatory agenda has moved on. 
Critically, the better regulation policy has now evolved 
into the ‘smart regulation’ policy. The book retains 
much of its force, however, partly because the tools 
of better regulation focussed upon have been retained 
within the smart regulation agenda. The analytical 
framework proposed should be adaptable to the focus 
of smart regulation upon the “whole policy cycle - from 
the design of a piece of legislation, to implementation, 
enforcement, evaluation, and revision.”  This suggests 
the work remains a valuable text for both policy-mak-
ers and academics.
Emily Hancox
